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1. Introduction
Soil degradation has long been recognized as a key factor in the low and
declining levels of agricultural productivity observed in some parts of
the developing world (Lynam et al., 1998; Scherr, 1999). In some highly
fragile environments, found most often in the tropics, soils may be highly
vulnerable to rapid and irreversible degradation with inappropriate
agricultural practices. In these cases, there are arguably two equilibria, one
with a relatively high level of productivity and another with a relatively
low level of productivity. The most visible example of this is when steeply
sloped land is cleared for agricultural use, making it vulnerable to extreme
erosion and gully formation. Other less visible examples exist as well, for
example when highly fertile volcanic ash soils are cleared for agricultural
use. If these soils are allowed to dry out completely, say due to a drought,
the soil structure and clay mineralogy can change irreversibly such that its
productivity reduces signiﬁcantly (e.g., Veldkamp, 1994).1
A great deal of research effort has been devoted to developing soil
conservation technologies that allow farmers to maintain or enhance
agricultural productivity by preventing soil degradation. As the preceding
examples suggest, these technologies enhance the resilience of agricultural
systems, i.e. they increase the system’s ability to remain in one stability
domain (say, one inwhich agricultural productivity can be sustained) when
subjected to shocks or perturbations before switching to another domain
(say, one in which agricultural productivity is not sustainable) (Holling,
1973; Perrings and Stern, 2000).
Situations in which soil degradation is rapid and irreversible are
relatively rare, however. In most cases, soil degradation is relatively slow,
occurring over multiple growing seasons, e.g. through gradual topsoil loss
from rainfall or nutrient mining by growing crops without sufﬁcient use
of fertilizers and incorporation of organic matter into the soil. This more
gradual form of soil degradation is manageable and reversible in most
cases. Topsoil loss can be prevented by various practices, such as contour
plowing and construction of terraces; nutrients and soil organic matter can
be returned to the soil by use of both organic and mineral fertilizers. In this
more typical situation, where soil degradation is physically reversible, it
might be argued that an agricultural system is characterized by a unique
global equilibrium, and onemight conclude that soil conservation practices
do not affect the resilience of agricultural systems in the same sense that
they do when soil degradation is irreversible.
Data from throughout the world show that in many cases where
substantial soil degradation has occurred, farmers choose not to adopt
soil conservation practices that could restore agricultural productivity to
a higher level. Consequently, soil degradation remains a serious threat to
agricultural productivity, particularly in the tropics (Oldeman et al., 1990;
Koning and Smaling, 2005). Many explanations for this situation have
been offered in the literature. Most of these explanations have to do with
1 With some extremely fragile soils it may not be possible to sustain a high level
productivity under any agricultural use, in which case one could argue that there
is a single, low-productivity equilibrium.
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institutional and economic failures that constrain farmers’ knowledge about
soil conservation or limit the incentives to invest in soil conservation (Lutz
et al., 1994; Heath and Binswanger, 1996; Scherr, 1999).
In this paper, using the concepts of multiple equilibria and resilience,
we provide a new explanation for persistent agricultural soil degradation,
despite the availability of seemingly effective soil conservation techno-
logies. We show that along the path of productivity decline associated with
soil degradation, the returns to investments in soil conservation increase to
a maximum value and decline thereafter. In the case where the returns are
ﬁrst positive but become negative beyond some point, two equilibria exist:
a high-productivity equilibrium in which a soil conservation technology
is adopted, and a low-level equilibrium in which a soil conservation
technology is not adopted. These equilibria are separated by a threshold
level of soil degradation, deﬁned as the point at which returns to the soil
conservation investment become negative. This analysis shows that once
soil degradation occurs beyond the threshold separating the two equilibria,
it may be physically reversible but economically irreversible, in the sense
that a rational farmerwould not invest in restoring the lost soil productivity.
This concept of economic irreversibility is closely related to the economic
literature on irreversible investment (Pindyck, 1991), ecosystem–economic
interactions (Kahn and O’Neill, 1999) and restoration of natural resources
(Zhao and Zilberman, 1999).
This paper beginswith adiscussion of properties of tropical soils andhow
these properties relate to the concept of resilience. Next we present a simple
model of a soil conservation investment, and use this model to provide a
heuristic explanation for the existence of multiple equilibria in agricultural
systems. We then demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria using a
case study of terracing investments in Peru. The paper concludes with a
discussion of policy implications.
2. Tropical soils and the resilience of agricultural systems
Tropical soils differentiate themselves mainly through the rate of various
soil-forming processes associated with speciﬁc climatic conditions. As
a result of high temperatures, high precipitation, and age, extremely
weathered and leached soils with a low inherent soil fertility are often
found in the tropics. The high rate of soil forming processes also increases
vulnerability to soil degradation, which can take place at a high rate (e.g.
Lal et al., 1997). Human activity is also an important driving factor behind
soil formation that may have either positive or negative effects on soil
productivity. On the one hand, soil fertility can be improved with the
application of fertilizers and organic matter. On the other hand, soils can
be degraded through nutrient depletion, pollution, and compaction. As we
show below, this vulnerability of tropical soils to degradation can cause
productivity to decline to the point that restorative investments in soil
conservation technologies may not be proﬁtable.
In most developing countries, soil degradation is prevalent, as shown by
Oldeman et al. (1990) in their global assessment of soil conditions. The rate
and degree of soil degradation depends on both soil properties, such as soil
organic matter content, that affect its resistance to degradation and on the
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land management practices that the farmer uses. Mining of soil resources
is often associated with resource-poor farmers, apparently because they
are not willing or able to make long-term investments to maintain the soil
quality (Shepherd and Soule, 1998).
Soil degradation is usually a reversible process. Typical examples are the
traditional slash andburn systemswhere soil fertility is extracted for several
seasons, after which the soil is left fallow for an extended period and soil
fertility is restored. However, soil degradation is irreversible in some cases.
Examples of permanent changes that have adverse productivity effects are
the drying of volcanic ash soils, the oxidation of acid-sulphate soils, and the
complete removal of topsoil by extreme rainfall events.
In this analysis, we follow the approach proposed by Droogers and
Bouma (1997) in which a soil is deﬁned in terms of a set of stable
characteristics (e.g. origin, soil depth, percent clay) that are a function of
the soil’s pedogenetic history (e.g. parent material) and a set of dynamic
properties (soil depth, nutrient and organic matter content, water holding
capacity) that depend on both the stable characteristics and on land use
history (the sequence of past crops grown and the associated management
decisions, such as fertilization and tillage). Crop productivity in turn
depends on these soil properties, as well as on climate, genetic properties of
the crop, and current management by the farmer. We deﬁne the following
variables: a vector c of stable soil characteristics; a vector h of land use
history (representing lagged values of crop choice, management, and soil
properties); a vector z of actual soil properties; a vector of climate variables
ε; crop genetic factors g and management x. Crop productivity potential
can be expressed in general terms by the production function2
y = f (x, z(c,h), g, ε). (1)
Crop growth models developed by agricultural scientists incorporate these
variables in a set of interrelated processes that link soil properties, climate,
and management to crop productivity (e.g. Tsuji et al., 1994).
A basic feature of crop production functions are the relationships
between the physical environment and plant growth. Given the genetic
characteristics of the crop, a plant will grow and produce a positive crop
output when soil properties and climatic conditions are within certain
bounds. For each soil property, a technically optimal value exists at
which yield is maximized, ceteris paribus, with yield non-increasing as the
characteristic deviates from the technical optimum and eventually reaching
zero. Often crop production functions exhibit a von Liebig-type response,
with a threshold value above which there is a plateau with little response
and below which productivity declines rapidly. For example, the potato
production function shows this behavior in the deep volcanic soils of the
Ecuadorian Andes, where topsoil depth has little impact on crop yield
until it reaches a critical value, beyond which productivity declines rapidly
towards zero (Antle and Stoorvogel, 2006).
2 For further discussion of this model, see Antle and Stoorvogel (2001).
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Using this model, soil degradation can be deﬁned as any process that
changes soil properties in ways that lower productivity. For example,
soil erosion reduces topsoil depth, reduces available nutrients and water,
and thus lowers crop productivity. Soil conservation practices prevent
the productivity losses associated with erosion. Conservation investments,
such as terraces, can capture topsoil being transported downhill by water
erosion, and thus can increase topsoil depth on terraced ﬁelds and restore
lost productivity.
3. Soil conservation investments and multiple equilibria
In this section we develop a conceptual model of soil conservation
investments, such as terraces, ridge tillage, ﬁlter strips, and agroforestry,
following Antle et al. (2005). This model utilizes the production function
described in the previous section that relates soil properties to productivity.
Following Stoorvogel et al. (2004) we deﬁne inherent productivity as the
productivity attainable at a site (i.e. a parcel of landmanaged as a unit, such
as a farmer’s ﬁeld) with a speciﬁed set of bio-physical conditions (soils,
topography, micro-climate) and a standard set of management practices.
Intuitively, inherent productivity represents what an experienced farmer
would know about the productivity potential of a parcel of land. Across
the landscape, inherent productivity represents the spatial variation in pro-
ductivity associated with spatial variation in soils and climate conditions.
Let the inherent productivity at a site indicated by the variable INPist
for crop i at site s in period t. Using the production function described
in the preceding section (equation (1)), we deﬁne x0 as a standard set of
management practices (fertilizer application, tillage, irrigation, etc.). The
inherent productivity at a site s in period t is deﬁned as INPist = f(x0, zist, g,
εist). Based on this deﬁnition, inherent productivity can be estimated with
bio-physical crop simulations models, executed with site-speciﬁc soils and
climate data and a standard set of management practices.
Generally, soil conservation investments may have three types of effects
on productivity. First, some conservation investments may enhance the
productivity of an un-degraded ﬁeld. This ‘augmentation effect’ could
occur, for example, by increasing organic matter contents in low fertility
soils. Following ﬁgure 1, a terrace would have an augmentation effect if it
were built in a ﬁeld at time t1 and the ﬁeld’s inherent productivity increased
over time along the path I.
More typical is a situation in which a ﬁeld is initially cultivated without
the use of conservation practices, soil productivity declines over time,
and at some later point in time conservation practices may be introduced.
Without theuse of conservationpractices, theﬁeld’s soil productivitywould
eventually decline to a new, low-level equilibrium (path II in ﬁgure 1).
Another possibility is that conservation practices are adopted on an un-
degraded ﬁeld at time t0 and productivity is maintained at the initial
level INP1. In this case, we shall say that the conservation investment has
an avoidance effect by preventing the productivity decline that otherwise
would have occurred. However, if a terrace were built at a later time
t2 > t1 when productivity had declined to INP2, and then part or all of
the lost productivity was restored, we shall say the terrace has a restoration
482 John M. Antle, Jetse J. Stoorvogel, and Roberto O. Valdivia
effect (paths III, IV and V). When the investment is made at a time such
as t2 before the land is fully degraded, there will typically be both an
avoidance effect (preventing productivity from falling from INP2 to INP3)
and a restoration effect (raising productivity to some level above INP2). If it
is not possible to fully restore productivity to the level of the un-degraded
soil, the productivity with a mature terrace will be at a level INP4 < INP1. If
the investment has the potential to augment productivity, then the mature
terrace might achieve a level of productivity greater than was possible with
un-degraded soils, e.g. INP5 > INP1.
An implication of the preceding discussion is that the effects of a soil
conservation investment on productivity depend on the initial conditions
of the system, i.e. the state of soil productivity at the site at the time the
investment is made. This initial condition determines the type of effect
that the conservation investment has. Note, in particular, that three distinct
possibilities exist:
1. If a ﬁeld were un-degraded at the time a conservation investment was
made, then the beneﬁts of the investment would be a pure avoidance
effect.
2. If a ﬁeldwere fully degraded at the time a conservation investment was
made, then the beneﬁts of the investment would be a pure restoration
effect.
3. If a ﬁeld were partially degraded at the time a conservation investment
was made, then the beneﬁts of the investment would be a combination
of an avoidance effect and a restoration effect.
As we shall show below, the possibility of multiple equilibria arises from
the fact that a conservation investment may not be proﬁtable from the
avoidance effect or the restoration effect alone, but may be proﬁtable when
the two effects are combined.
3.1 Existence of multiple equilibria
In this section we use a simple linear approximation to the productivity
effects of terraces in the model presented above to provide a heuristic
explanation for the existence of multiple equilibria in soil conservation
investment problems. In the following section we conﬁrm the intuition
of this heuristic analysis with an empirical example and provide some
evidence of the empirical signiﬁcance of multiple equilibria.
The problem addressed here is whether or not to invest in soil con-
servation at each site s, assuming the farmer makes this decision under
different intial soil conditions. The economically rational farmerwill choose
to invest in a capital asset such as a terrace or other soil conservation
technology if the expected NPV of the production system with the
investment is higher than the expectedNPVwithout the investment. Deﬁne
NPV(i,s,t,τ ), i=N,C, as the returns to the conventional technology (N) and
the conservation technology (C) at site s, calculated over time interval t,
at point τ in time. The farmer will make the investment if and only if
NPV(N,C,s,t,τ )=NPV(C,s,t,τ )−NPV(N,s,t,τ )> 0. If NPV< 0 the
farmer does not make the investment, production continues at the site,
and at time τ + 1 the farmer again assesses whether or not to make a soil
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t1 t2 t3
Time
Inherent
productivity
INP1
INP2
INP3 II
I
III
IV
V
INP6
INP4
INP5
Figure 1. Modeling the effects of conservation investments on productivity: the
augmentation, avoidance, and restoration effects
Source: Antle et al. (2005).
conservation investment. Note that with certainty and perfect foresight, the
optimal time for the investment will be the point τ ∗ where NPV(τ ∗)> 0
and NPV(τ ∗)>NPV(τ ) for all τ . With uncertainty, the optimal timing of
the investment could involve risk aversion as well as option values (Fisher
and Krutilla, 1985).
To demonstrate the existence of multiple equilibria in this type of
problem, we make some simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that
each ﬁeld has a unique initial inherent productivity associated with the
bio-physical conditions at that site. Therefore, each ﬁeld can be thought of
as starting at a different point along a path like II in ﬁgure 1. Second, we
set t= t3 – t1 so that farmers are always looking t time periods into the
future at each point in time. Third, we assume that the paths such as II and
IV in ﬁgure 1 are linear and that the slope of the two paths are equal, as
shown in ﬁgure 2. Thus, in ﬁgure 2, starting at time t1 with productivity
INP1, a farmer who does not invest in a soil conservation technology sees
productivity follow the path ABDF over time, declining eventually to level
INP3. If the farmer decides to invest at some point t2 such that t1 < t2 < t3,
productivity follows a path such as ABCE. If the farmer were to invest at
time t3, then productivity follows the path ABDG.
To prove that multiple equilibria may exist, we need to derive the
behavior of NPV as we change the initial conditions of the investment
problem (the inherent productivity of the soil). For this purpose we can
compare three cases represented in ﬁgure 2. First, consider the case of
choosing to invest when productivity is at level INP1. In this case, there
is only an avoidance effect that can be measured in terms of cumulative
productivity as the area between the lines AC and AD over the interval
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time
Inherent productivity
INP1
INP2
INP3
t1 t2 t3 t5
A C
B
D
tb
INPb
t4
F
E
H
G
Figure 2. Inherent productivity paths without and with terracing
(t1,t3), i.e. the triangle ACD. Second, consider the case of choosing to
invest when productivity is initially at the level INP3 (i.e. after the soil is
completely degraded) with the farmer basing decisions on the productivity
path between t3 and t5. In this case, there is a restoration effect equal to
the area between lines DG and DH, i.e. the triange DGH. Thus, by the
geometry of the ﬁgure, it is obvious that the avoidance effect ACD is equal
to the restoration effect DGH. Third, consider the case of choosing to invest
at time t2 half way between t1 and t3. In this case, there is both an avoidance
effect and a restoration effect. By the geometry of the problem, it is easy
to see that the the combined avoidance and restoration effects of this third
case is the area BCEFD and is therefore 50 per cent greater than the pure
avoidance effect ACD or the pure restoration effect (DGH).
The implication of the previous paragraph is thatNPV follows a pattern
illustrated in ﬁgure 3 (note, however, that NPV is measured in different
units than INP). By the geometry of ﬁgure 2, the relationship in ﬁgure 3 will
be concave downwardswith a uniquemaximum. This analysis suggests the
possible existence of multiple equilibria, as demonstrated by the following
three cases:
Case 1: The farmer always invests. By the construction of this example,
NPV(t1)=NPV(t3); hence, if NPV(t1)> 0, then NPV(t)> 0 for all t.
Therefore, the rational farmer will invest at some point in time. Because
the terrace is proﬁtable at t1, itmight be argued that the investmentwould
be made at that time. However, a farmer with foresight might know that
returns would be higher at some later time and would delay investing
until then.
Case 2: The farmer never invests. Another possibility is that NPV< 0 for
all times along the path ABDF, hence, the farmer would choose not to
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time
∆NPV
t1 t2 t3
Case 1
Case 3
Case 2
tbta
Figure 3. NPV changes associated with Case 1 (the farmer always invests), Case 2 (the
farmer never invests), and Case 3 (investment depends on initial conditions)
invest in a conservation technology. Note that, in this example, NPV(t)
achieves its maximum at t2; hence this case corresponds to the situation
where NPV(t2)< 0.
Case 3: The farmer’s investment choice depends on the initial conditions. This is the
case that provides the possibility of multiple equilibria. Starting at point
A in ﬁgure 2, suppose that NPV(t1)< 0, but that it becomes positive
along the path between points A and D, so that NPV(t2)> 0. As noted
earlier, under the assumptionsmade for ﬁgure 2, the productivity effect of
the investment made at point A is equal to the the effect at point D, hence
NPV(t1)=NPV(t3)< 0. Therefore, there exist points t1 < ta < tb < t3
and corresponding productivity levels INPa and INPb such that
NPV(ta)=NPV(tb)= 0 and NPV(t)> 0 for ta < t< tb (see ﬁgure 3).
It follows that any land unit with initial productivity greater than INPb
will have NPV> 0 at some point in time and therefore the farmer will
invest in a terrace. However, any land unit with initial productivity less
than INPb will have NPV< 0 at all times and therefore the farmer will
never invest.
Finally, we note that by the symmetry of the productivity paths AD and
DG (Case 3), it can be shown that, if a farmer were to invest at t3, NPV
would follow the same pattern as starting at t1. However, without some
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change in the system, returns to investment are negative at t3 and the farmer
has no incentive to invest. Once productivity has fallen below INPb, some
change in or shock to the system would be needed to increase productivity
enough to make the investment proﬁtable. One way this could happen
would be for a governmental or non-governmental organization to provide
the farmer with a ﬁnancial incentive to invest, as has been done in many
development projects. If such incentives were provided for a long enough
time for productivity to rise above the threshold where the investment is
proﬁtable, then it would become economically sustainable without further
subsidization. We elaborate on the policy implications of this analysis in
the concluding section.
4. Evidence from a case study of terrace investments in Peru
In this section, we utilize a model from a case study of terrace investments
in Peru (Antle et al., 2005) to provide empirical support to the analysis in
the previous section. This study utilized data collected in the La Encan˜ada
watershed in the Cajamarca region of northern Peru. This region is
characterized by three agro-ecological zones: the valley ﬂoors, the lower
hillsides, and the upper hillsides. We focus our analysis on the steeply
sloped lower-hillside region, where cropland is the principal land use
and the average slope exceeds 25 per cent. Erosion is a major threat to
the productivity on the shallow soils. About one-third of the cropland in
the watershed has been terraced, in part due to subsidies provided by the
Peruvian government and non-governmental entities.
The productivity dynamics of ﬁgure 1 will now be incorporated into
a model for the economic assessment of returns to investments in soil
conservation technologies. Farmers are assumed to choose land use and
inputs to maximize expected net returns on each land unit they manage.
Expected net returns for activity i (crop, fallow, other land use) at site s in
period t are deﬁned as
NRist = pistqist − Cist
where:
qist = qist(pist, wist, INPist)=quantity supplied of output i
pist = expected price of output i
Cist =
∑
j wijst vijst =variable cost function
vijst = vij(pist, wist, INPist)=quantity demanded of input j
wijst =price of input j for output i, wist is the corresponding vector
INPist = inherent productivity of activity i
The output quantities supplied and input quantities demanded are derived
from a static single-period expected proﬁt maximization, where input
decisions are made at the beginning of the crop cycle, given previous land
use, input prices and expected output prices.
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In each crop cycle, the farmer chooses the activity at site s to maximize
expected returns by solving
NRst = max{δist}
∑
i
δist NRist
where δist = 1 if activity i is chosen and δist = 0 otherwise. We deﬁne the
economic value of a production system k at site s as the net present value
NPVks =
T∑
i=1
Dt(NRst − CMkst) − FCks
where:
T=number of decision periods in the planning horizon
Dt = (1/(1+ r))t =discount rate with interest rate r per decision period
CMkst = conservation investment maintenance cost
FCks = conservation investment ﬁxed cost.
An econometric process simulation model of the production system was
used to implement the analysis (Valdivia, 2002; Antle et al., 2005). This
model is based on the speciﬁcation and estimation of output supply and
input demand equations for each activity (potatoes and tubers, cereals,
legumes, and pasture). These econometric models are estimated using the
inherent productivity data derived from corresponding bio-physical crop
models as inputs to represent spatial variation inproductivity. Thesemodels
are then used as the basis for the construction of a simulation model that
characterizes, for each ﬁeld, the choice of land use in each growing season
(crop, pasture, or fallow), and the management (variable input use) for the
selected activity in each season.
Productivity dynamics in a farmer’s ﬁeld depend on bio-physical
conditions (soil depth, soil organic matter, etc.) and these conditions are
in turn partly dependent on management (crop choice, tillage, fertilizer
applications, etc.). In principle, bio-physicalmodels, such as theDSSATcrop
models (Tsuji et al., 1994) could be used to estimate the productivity dynam-
ics of a crop production system over time, if the changes in soil properties
that occurred over time were known. Alternatively, more complex agro-
ecosystem models, such as EPIC (Williams et al., 1983) or Century (Parton
et al., 1994), that jointly simulate crop growth and soil processes, could
be used. However, these more complex models involve a large number
of parameters – data that often are not available on a site-speciﬁc basis.
Another limitation is that existing bio-physical models were not developed
to represent soil processes in terraced systems. Therefore, there is a
knowledgegap in the literature regarding thedynamics of cropproductivity
under terraced conditions.
Given this gap in the bio-physical science literature, in this analysis we
implement a simpler modeling approach that allows us to utilize data from
the scientiﬁc literature and ﬁeld measurements (e.g. ﬁeld slope, top soil
depth, soil organicmatter) that are related to bio-physical processes together
with a priori assumptions about the relationship between slope and terrace
productivity, and then subject these assumptions to sensitivity analysis. To
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implement this approach, we make two key assumptions. First, we assume
that there is a monotonic increasing productivity path from the time the
investment is made to the time when the investment matures (i.e. when its
full productivity potential is realized). Second, we assume that there is a
monotonic relationship between ﬁeld slope and the productivity potential
of terraces. If slope is changed due to a terrace, it will reduce soil erosion
by water, provide more moisture retention for crop use, and make it easier
to work the soil.
As illustrated in ﬁgure 1, the productivity potential of a terrace depends
on the augmentation, restoration, and avoidance effects. To model these
relationships, we deﬁne the maximum amount of productivity that can be
gained froma terrace (ATmax ≥ 100) or lost througherosion (0≤AEmax ≤ 100)
relative to a base value of 100. For a site with a ﬁeld slope of SLOPEs ≤ 100
per cent, we deﬁne the total site-speciﬁc productivity change from terracing
and from erosion as
ATs = (100 + (ATmax − 100) · (SLOPEs/100)α)/100
AEs = (100 + (100 − AEmax) · (SLOPEs/100)β)/100,
where α and β are positive parameters between zero and one. We assume
that the path between the initial productivity level and theﬁnal productivity
level is linear, as inﬁgure 2. Thus, given abase value of inherent productivity
of INPis0, the inherent productivity at time t on an unterraced ﬁeld is given
by INPist = (t/T) · (AEs − 1) · INPis0, and inherent productivity on a terraced
ﬁeld is given by INPist = (t/T) · (AEs − 1) · INPis0.
To investigate the potential for multiple equilibria, the production model
with terraces was simulated for 1,000 ﬁelds randomly sampled from the
La Encan˜ada region. Antle et al. (2005) show that, under a set of plausible
assumptions aboutkeybio-physical andeconomicvariables (e.g. ﬁeld slope,
terrace productivity, discount rates), the proportion of ﬁelds where terraces
are proﬁtable can range from as low as 10 per cent to as high as 90 per cent.
Simulations were run for a set of scenarios that represent different levels of
terrace investment subsidy, andalso for scenarios representingdifferent bio-
physical conditions (low and high ﬁeld slope) and location (low altitude
and high altitude) that affect terrace productivity. The simulations were
initiated at points t1, t2 and t3 as deﬁned in ﬁgures 2 and 3, with points 1
and 3 separated by 20 growing seasons (ten years).
Figure 4 shows the results of the simulations in the format of ﬁgure 3.
The ﬁgure shows the average change in NPV for terrace adoption plotted
for the full sample of 1,000 ﬁelds, as well as for ﬁelds corresponding to low
and high slope groups and low and high altitude groups. Figure 4 conﬁrms
the hypothesized relationships of ﬁgure 3, and shows that all three cases
identiﬁed in ﬁgure 3 exist in the La Encan˜ada watershed.
Table 1 summarizes the data for all of the scenarios that were simulated.
In the base case (no subsidies, all slopes and altitudes), about 29 per cent
of ﬁelds have multiple equilibria (Case 3), whereas about 31 per cent of
the ﬁelds correspond to Case 1 (terraces always proﬁtable) and about
24 per cent correspond to Case 2 (terraces never proﬁtable). These results
are case speciﬁc, but suggest that multiple equilibria do exist in a marginal
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Figure 4. Average simulated difference in NPV for adoption of terraces, for all ﬁelds,
for low and high slope, and for low and high altitude ﬁelds, La Encan˜ada watershed,
Cajamarca, Peru
Table 1. Percent of sites with multiple equilibria for terrace investments,
La Encan˜ada watershed, Cajamarca, Peru
Scenario Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Base 31 40 29
Low subsidy∗ 50 19 31
High subsidy∗∗ 82 5 13
Low altitude 58 11 31
High altitude 0 74 26
Low slope 22 50 28
High slope 44 24 32
Notes: ∗75 per cent subsidy of investment cost.
∗∗75 per cent subsidy of investment plus maintenance costs.
Case 1= always invest.
Case 2=never invest.
Case 3=multiple equilibria.
agricultural system that is typical of conditions seen in various parts of the
world. Figure 4 and Table 1 show that subsidies reduce the proportion
of cases where multiple equilibria occur, because the proﬁtability of
the investment is higher with a subsidy. When both investment and
maintenance subsidies are available, the simulations show that over 80 per
cent of the terraces are proﬁtable, and the likelihood of multiple equilibria
is substantially reduced. Table 1 also shows that the likelihood of multiple
equilibria is fairly stable across bio-physical conditions and location. The
proportion of Cases 1 (always proﬁtable) and 2 (never proﬁtable) varies
substantially across slope and altitude. At high altitude, where productivity
is low, there are no sites where terrace investments are always proﬁtable.
Terraces are proﬁtable on 44 per cent of highly sloped ﬁelds, twice as often
as on ﬁelds with low slopes.
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5. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we have shown through both heuristic argument and an
empirical example that production systems with conservation investments
may exhibit multiple equilibria. This result will apply to any situation
where an investment can bemade that prevents the loss of productivity and
restores lost productivity, a feature typical of soil conservation investments.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the resilience of agricultural
systems is likely to be highly variable, depending on a combination of
bio-physical and economic conditions. In a world in which economically
feasible conservation technologies are available to well-informed farmers
with access to well-functioning product, input, and credit markets, systems
are resilient in the sense that most farmers will make proﬁtable soil
conservation investments before land resources became highly degraded.
Under these conditions – arguably approximated by the situation in much
of the industrialized world – the phenomenon of multiple equilibria is
not likely to be very important. However, the possibility of multiple
equilibria and economic irreversibility is more likely to be important in
developing countries, because their agricultural systems are far less resilient
and because economic and institutional conditions are not favorable to
farmers making conservation investments that could prevent high levels
of degradation. Therefore, the likelihood that farmers may degrade soils
beyond the threshold point where conservation investments are proﬁtable
is much higher.
The possibility of multiple equilibria and economically irreversible
soil degradation has several notable policy implications. First, subsidies
for adoption of conservation investments can reduce the likelihood that
irreversible degradation will occur, but there may be a high cost to
prevention of economically irreversible degradation. Whether or not this
cost should be borne by society requires assessing both the private and
social beneﬁts and costs of soil degradation. As our simulation results show,
offering farmers subsidies to construct terraces could reduce the number
of ﬁelds where multiple equilibria – and thus economically irreversible
degradation – could occur. But our case study suggests that a high level
of subsidization may be required to eliminate this possibility, and under
current and foreseeable conditions in many regions of the developing
world neither subsidies nor other actions needed to prevent high levels
of degradation are likely to be feasible.
Second, the timing and duration of policies to support adoption of soil
conservation practices is important in preventing soil degradation and
restoring lost soil productivity. Moreover, our analysis suggests that soil
conservation policies or programs, as typically implemented, are unlikely
to lead to the permanent adoption of soil conservation practices once soils
become highly degraded. Our analysis shows that once farmers have de-
graded soils to the point that the system is operating in the low-productivity
domain, a subsidy to encourage adoption of soil conservation practices will
have to bemaintained long enough for soil productivity to be restored to the
point that the system returns to the high-productivity domain. Due to the
site-speciﬁc character of soil degradation and its relation to soil productivity,
the time required to return a system fromone equilibrium to another is likely
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to be highly variable. Therefore, soil conservation projects of a short, ﬁxed
duration may not succeed in restoring most sites to the equilibrium where
a high level of productivity is sustainable. The farther is the degradation
below the threshold separating the two equilibria, and the slower is the rate
at which soil productivity can be restored, the longer will subsidies have to
be maintained to successfully restore the system to the high-productivity
equilibrium.
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